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Three cases raising questions of liability on checks involved
acts of a malefactor in receiving payment from a drawee bank
after making alterations or forging indorsements on the checks.
Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v. ,State Budget & Control Bd.1 pre-
sented the court with the question of when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run on the depositor's cause of action against his
bank to remove the debit of the account for a check paid bearing
a forged indorsement.2 The plaintiff-drawer argued for the rule
followed in a few states that his cause of action against the bank
did not accrue until discovery of the forgery,3 but the court
rejected this and adopted the more widely accepted view that the
statute starts to run as of the date the bank renders to the de-
positor its statement showing the charging of the check to the
depositor's account.4 In reaching this result, the court approved
of the technical rationale expressed in Kansas City Title & Trust
Co. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank5 that the return of the check to the
depositor bearing a forged indorsement with a statement show-
ing the charge of the amount of the check to the depositor's
account is a denial of liability, thus dispensing with the require-
ment of the depositor's demand to recover the amount of the
check. On broader policy grounds, the court was apparently
influenced by the underlying purpose of the statute of limita-
tions as a statute of repose.
While this rule may work a hardship on a person who does
not learn of his cause of action until after the statute has run,
it is "necessarily incident to a law arbitrarily making legal
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 246 S.C. 140, 142 S.E2d 874 (1965).
2. The rule is well settled that the drawer has a cause of action to remove
the debit of his account where the drawee pays an order check on a forged in-
dorsement since no interest in the instrument passes and the drawee has not
paid the payee or holder as directed by the drawer. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW § 23; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404; See Singletary
& Son, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank, 243 S.C. 180, 133 S.E.2d 118 (1963);
Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937) ; Yarborough v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank, 162 S.C. 332, 160 S.E. 844 (1931).
3. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Edgerly, 121 So. 2d 417, (Fla. 1960);
New York v. Fidelity Trust Co., 243 App. Div. 46, 276 N.Y. Supp. 341 (1934).
4. For a collection of the authorities see, Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 933 (1962).
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remedies contingent on mere lapse of time' 6 so that parties to a
transaction may consider the matter closed at some definitely
designated point in time.
7
The Uniform Commercial Code adopts the view of the Citi-
zens d So. Nat'Z Bank case by providing that the drawer is pre-
cluded from asserting an unauthorized indorsement if he does
not report it to his bank within three years after the statement
and check are made available to him. Since the Commercial
Code has been enacted in forty-four jurisdictions, including
those which had applied the minority view, this rule is probably
now unanimous.
8
Acts of a wrongdoer in forging indorsements and receiving
payment on checks raised the issue of liability between the pre-
senting bank which had cashed the checks and the drawee which
had paid them in County Bank v. South Carolina Natl Bank.0
The checks in question were sent by the drawers to the personnel
manager of a plant for delivery to employees named as payees,
who forged the signature of the payees, added his indorsement
and cashed the checks at the defendant bank. The defendant
bank then forwarded them to the plaintiff-drawee bank with
indorsements guaranteed. The plaintiff paid the checks and
charged the amounts to the account of the drawer. Upon discov-
ery of the forged indorsement of this order instrument, the
drawer could clearly compel the removal of the debit of his
account by the drawee. 10 The drawee could then recover from
the presenting bank, alternatively on the theory that payment
was made under a mistake of fact giving rise to the right of
restitution,"' or for breach of the express warranty of all in-
6. 34 Am. Ju. Limitation of Actions § 230 (1938).
7. See Livingston v. Sims, 197 S.C. 458, 15 S.E2d 770 (1941).
8. UNiFoni COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(4).
9. 244 S.C. 327, 137 S.E2d 281 (1964).
10. See note 2, supra.
11. As analyzed by Professor Britton, this result is not based on the theory
of breach of implied warranty of title under the UNiFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW §§ 65-66 which prescribe the liability of an indorser as a warrantor
since the holder upon presenting the check for payment does not negotiate or sell
it and the drawee does not become a holder. The theory of recovery is the
drawee's common law quasi-contracted action. BRITToN, BILLS AND NOTES § 139
(2d ed. 1961). The UNIFORm COMMraERCIAL CODE § 3-417(1) (a) creates an im-
plied warranty of the genuineness of indorsements so that the presenting party
would be liable to the drawee in the amount of payment received under a forged
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dorsements guaranteed.12 This case did not fit into this pattern
of established law, however. The drawer did not seek to remove
the debit of his account since he was reimbursed by the employer
of the forger with funds from its insurer under a policy of insur-
ance covering loss from forgeries. Finding that the plaintiff
had suffered no loss, the court affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment for the defendant.
Where a drawer has insurance covering losses resulting from
forged checks, the usual practice is for the insurer to advance
the amount of coverage and take back a loan receipt by which
the insured agrees to repay the "loan" if recovery is made from
the bank. This device has been generally held effective to per-
mit the insured to recover from the bank free of the defense of
payment and the amount recovered will then be paid over to the
insurer.' 3 In the instant case, the court referred to the plaintiff's
contention that a loan receipt had been executed thereby pre-
serving its rights against the defendant. The court dismissed
this contention without going further into the circumstances
surrounding the loan receipt. It is therefore impossible to deter-
mine from the reported case the court's disposition of this aspect
of the decision.
Defalcations of an employee in forging and altering a number
of checks over a two year period again raised the issue of risk
of loss in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank. 4
The plaintiff was a surety company which had paid the em-
ployer under a fidelity bond and sought to recover from the
drawee bank by way of subrogation. After a review of the evi-
dence in the record, the court found that it was sufficient to
support the finding of fact below that the drawer was negligent
in its internal procedures in the preparation, issuance and hand-
ling of the checks and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the losses. The court also concluded that despite some
indication on the face of some of the checks that they had been
altered, the finding below that defendant was free of negligence
in paying the checks under these circumstances was not without
evidentiary support. From these facts the court applied the
12. Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Edisto Nat'l Bank, 166 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 178
(1932); Newberry Say. Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 91 S.C. 294, 74 S.E. 615
(1911).
13. Luchenbach v. W. J. McCahun Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918);
Singletary & Son, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank, 243 S.C. 180, 133 S.E.2d 118
(1963).
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general rule of estoppel against the drawer, and thus the plain-
tiff-surety, to assert the alterations and forged indorsements
as a basis for recovering the debits against the account.
The leading case establishing this principle is the English
decision of Young v. Grote,' which held that a drawer who so
negligently draws an instrument as to facilitate its material
alteration is liable to a drawee who pays the altered instrument
in good faith. This rule was not expressly written into the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law but is generally followed as
common law.'0
The Uniform Commercial Code would dictate a similar result
by the provision:
The customer is precluded from asserting against the
bank an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same
wrongdoer on any other item paid in good faith by the bank
after the first item and statement was available to the cus-
tomer for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calen-
dar days and before the bank receives notification from the
customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration.
17
This statutory coverage removes the difficulty of the factual
finding of negligence and is based on the theory that the cus-
tomer's failure to report the first forgery or alteration presents
the opportunity to the wrongdoer to repeat his misdeeds. The
Commercial Code would also continue the rule recognized by the
court that the estoppel against the customer would not apply if
he can establish lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank
in paying the item.' s
B. ChatteZ Security
In First Nat'l Bank v. Wade"9 the plaintiff had instituted an
action in claim and delivery to recover on a past due note and
chattel mortgage on a car executed by the defendant to the seller
of the car and subsequently assigned to the plaintiff bank. The
lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for possession of
15. 4 Bing. 253 (1827).
16. Hair v. Winnsboro Bank, 103 S.C. 343, 88 S.E. 26 (1915). This rule is
codified in the UNIFORMi COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-406, 4-406; See Annot., 42
A.L.R.2d 1071 (1955).
17. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(2) (b).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(3).
19. 245 S.C. 426, 141 S.E.2d 102 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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the collateral and damages for the unlawful detention. The
defendant appealed on the ground that the assertion of breach
of warranty in the sale of the car required a jury determination
on this issue; held, affirmed as to the possession of the auto-
mobile since defendant could not defeat plaintiff's right of pos-
session by asserting that he was entitled to an offset for partial
failure of consideration. As to the damages for wrongful deten-
tion of the automobile, however, their assessment is a fact ques-
tion which must be determined by the jury upon remand for a
new trial.
The perennial problem of measuring the propriety in the con-
duct of a mortgage liquidation sale2 0 was again before the court
in Callicutt v. Brown.21 The defendant had purchased an auto-
mobile from the plaintiff executing a conditional sales contract
for the unpaid balance which was assigned to a finance com-
pany. After making three payments, the defendant defaulted
and the finance company took possession of the vehicle and
sold it at public auction to the plaintiff, the only bidder, for
less than one-fourth of the original purchase price. The plaintiff
repurchased the conditional sale contract from the finance com-
pany and brought action for the remaining indebtedness due.
In affirming a directed verdict for the plaintiff, the court held
that there was no evidence of impropriety in the liquidation sale
and no question as to liability or the amount due, and therefore
no issue to submit to the jury.
In approving the liquidation sale the court presumably was
satisfied that the payment of one-fourth of the initial selling
price of the automobile was not so inadequate as to raise a pre-
sumption of fraud,22 even though the facts could be viewed as
though the mortgagee had purchased, in which case the ade-
quacy of the price will be more closely scrutinized by the court.28
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Webb 24 involved a contest between
the holder of a chattel mortgage on an automobile and the claim
of the state which seized it under a statute which provides:
"Every vehicle . . . used in hunting of deer at night is hereby
20. See, e.g., Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E.2d 311
(1964) : Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E2d 750 (1963).
21. 244 S.C. 164, 135 S.E.2d 852 (1964).
22. See Henry v. Blakely, 216 S.C. 13, 56 S.E.2d 581 (1949); Poole v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 174 S.C. 150, 177 S.E. 24 (1934).
23. Black v. Hair, 2 Hill's Eq. 622 (S.C. 1837).
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declared forfeited to the State .... ,,25 While this precise issue
was one of first impression in this state, the court reasoned by
analogy from the cases which have protected the interest of an
innocent chattel mortgagee of an automobile against the claims
of the state under a statute which calls for the confiscation of
the vehicle when used illegally to transport liquor.26 It was
argued that this line of cases is distinguishable on the ground
that the statute involved in the instant case at the time of its
initial enactment provided--"used with the knowledge or con-
sent of the owner thereof or of the agent of such owner in
charge of such vehicle . . . ." and this language was deleted
by the South Carolina General Assembly in 1952. Since the
legislature removed the protection accorded innocent owners of
vehicles used in night deer hunting, it was argued that it was
the legislative purpose to remove the protection of other inno-
cent parties, such as the holder of a security interest in the
vehicle, from the claims of the state. The court failed to find
any such legislative intent to deprive an innocent holder of a
security interest of his claim in a motor vehicle from the fact
that the present statute does not protect the owner.
In dismissing an action for damages for an alleged unlawful
repossession of chattel, the court in Bing v. GeneraZ Motors
Acceptance Oorp.27 affirmed the familiar principle that upon
default in the payment of a promissory note secured by a secur-
ity interest in chattel, title to the chattel vests in the secured
party with right to possession and the right to enter peaceably
on the debtor's premises to make seizure.2 8
In dismissing an action by the plaintiff to assert a "purchase
money lien" against property sold to one defendant and mort-
gaged to the other defendant in the amount of the unpaid pur-
chase price, the federal court in Seneca Grape Juice Corp. v.
PaZmetto Grape Marketing Ass'n,29 had occasion to apply the
25. S.C. CODE AxN. §§ 28-457 to -458 (1962).
26. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chestnut, 158 S.C. 42, 155 S.E. 231
(1930); Manufacturer's Fin. Acceptance Corp. v. Bramlett, 157 S.C. 419,
154 S.E. 410 (1930); Ward v. Greer, 155 S.C. 426, 152 S.E. 678 (1930);
Seignious v. Limehouse, 107 S.C. 545, 93 S.E. 193 (1917) ; Moody v. McKinney,
73 S.C. 438, 53 S.E. 543 (1905).
27. 237 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
28. Mishoe v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 234 S.C. 182, 107 S.E.2d 43I1959) ; Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869 (1941);
ustin v. Universal Credit Co., 189 S.C. 487, 1 S.E.2d 508 (1939).
29. 234 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.S.C. 1964).
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established principle of South Carolina law that a vendor of
personal property has no lien for the unpaid purchase price
unless he takes a purchase money mortgage, or complies with
the attachment law, in acquiring a lien.30
(. Sales
In Alfelanus v. Midland Valley Lumber Co."" the court
awarded the plaintiff-buyer damages for breach of contract to
sell logs based on an amount of profits lost by an expected
resale, less the cost he would have incurred in handling. This
result is an application of the modern principle that the party
breaching a sales contract is liable for consequential damages
which naturally flow from the breach, including such profits as
could be reasonably anticipated had the contract been per-
formed.
3 2
Earlier common law decisions usually excluded profits as an
element of recovery in actions for breach of contract under a
rigid application of the "foreseeability" rule announced in the
leading English case of Hadley v. Bawendale3s conditioning
liability on a showing that the seller had knowledge of the
buyer's particular resale contract and the profit contemplated
by it. Another obstacle to the recovery of such special damages
was the tendency of the courts to conclude that the alleged loss
of profits is too speculative to be considered, requiring almost
mathematical precision in the proof of loss.3 4  Over the past
half-century there has been a gradual erosion of this attitude
of restrictive damages. The certainty rule has become a more
flexible standard of "reasonable certainty"35 and the foreseeabil-
ity requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale is usually presumed,
especially where the breaching party knows that he is dealing
with a merchant and thus should assume that the breach will
result in lost profits.3 6 The modern attitude which rejects the
30. Ross v. Eddins, 187 S.C. 29, 196 S.E. 375 (1938) ; Maxwell v. Greene,
171 S.C. 253, 172 S.E. 146 (1933).
31. 232 F. Supp. 885 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
32. South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 113
S.E.2d 329 (1960); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Wilson, 141 S.C. 182, 139 S.E.
395 (1927).
33. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 154 (1854).
34. See, e.g., Standard Supply Co. v. Canter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 62 S.E.
150 (1908).
35. See, e.g., Charles v. Texas Co., 199 S.C. 156, 18 S.E.2d 719 (1942).
36. See generally Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and
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nineteenth century tendency to minimize the damages recover-
able on breach is expressed generally in the Uniform Commercial
Code in the following language: "The remedies provided by
this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed . . . . 37The McManus decision is in
the mainstream of this current development.
In IV. R. Grace Co. v. LaMunon38 the court reversed a judg-
ment for the defendant-buyer of fertilizer on a counter-claim for
damages resulting from a breach of express warranty that it
contained a pesticide which would effectively protect his cu-
cumnber crop from nematodes on the ground that the trial judge
committed error in failing to instruct the jury that they must
take into account the expense which the defendant would have
had in harvesting and processing the crop that would not have
been lost without the breach. While the aggrieved party to a
sales contract is entitled to be "put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed,"3 9 if the jury fails to take into
account the cost which he would have incurred in handling the
crop, the result would be a windfall benefit in this amount.
D. Legislation
A most significant action by the South Carolina General As-
sembly in the field of commercial transactions in the 1965 ses-
sion was the step taken toward enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. This comprehensive codification of the great bulk
of commercial law passed the house of representatives, was favor-
ably reported out of the senate judiciary committee but failed
to come up for a vote on the crucial second reading in the
senate before adjournment. With the additional year for con-
sideration of the Code, the 1966 session of the South Carolina
Senate should be in the position to come to a decision as to
whether this state will join the other forty-four jurisdictions
which have stated the law of commercial transactions in terms
of contemporary commercial needs by the enactment of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.
40
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106(1).
38. 245 S.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 337 (1964).
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106(1).
40. See, Foster, The Proposed Uniform Coinmerial Code: A New Bottle
for Old and New Wines, 15 S.C.L REv. 623 (1963).
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